Q:
If I make up a text about a text that's spoken on a tortoise shell on a tortoise shell, that is, if I write on or about the shell of a living tortoise supporting a woofer, am I a conceptualist?A: Maybe. Sketches to follow.
There is a definitional flaw with the Kenneth Goldsmith-Marjorie Perloff experiment in theorizing: their retrieving the superordinate term
conceptual to promote an array of processual poetries -- a categorical overreach. Little doubt the term
conceptual evokes, first, audacious gesture, readymades from Marcel Duchamp, legendary erasure of a drawing by Willem De Kooning by young Robert Rauschenberg, or more recent, Damien Hirst's sharks suspended in formaldehyde. Hirst, Rauchenberg, Duchamp -- I imagine both Goldsmith and Perloff enjoy associating with these types of daring and achievement. Second, and more parallel to the Goldsmith-Perloff experiment,
conceptual is a descriptor of New York-based art projects of the late 60s and early 70s, with linkages by broad association to Sol LeWitt, Lawrence Weiner, John Baldessari, et al. I think this is the primary linkage intended. Indeed, Sol LeWitt comes closest to the Goldsmith-Perloff processual paradigm, having famously uttered, "idea becomes a machine that makes the art." This is only one construct from that era, however. Lawrence Weiner, in contrast, describes conceptual art as thought conveyance through which
texts, written instructions, for example, substitute for or obviate artifact. With this formula we have text that proposes vignettes and procedures for imagining artifacts such as poetry, which results in an Occam's razor-like approach to conceptualization, a lean and potentially cool treatment or abstract, a metatext, in any event. Around the time LeWitt, Weiner, and Baldessari first practiced, poets were meta-texting with varying coolness, Bernadette Mayer, Clark Coolidge, John Ashbery, Aram Saroyan, Ray DiPalma, Jennifer Bartlett, Ted Berrigan, Bruce Andrews, Jamie MacInnis, Ron Padgett, Larry Fagin, Jim Brodey, and others, their poems built in part on compressed vignettes and linguistic
what-ifs, propositions about (and within) propositions, each an idea "that makes the art."
The reasoning to follow needs to address Mayer's
Studying Hunger, her list of writing experiments as well as Charles Bernstein's adaptations, additional samples from Coolidge, Ashbery, and others building their ideas toward ideas. We need to make the more specific case for their having maintained the so-called author-function
versus shifting that function via mechanics and other maneuvers of process (transcriptions of radio broadcasts, e.g.). In sum, it's necessary to distinguish between at least two kinds of temperament for conceptual poetics, one authored, if you will, and one processed. For sure, there are numerous examples of text production that conflates these temperaments. Also, with regard to the novelty of contemporary process constraints on practice, fiddling with authorship, authority, and originality underpins the impassive gaming and automaton features common to earlier process-oriented text experimentation by John Cage, the Oulipo poets, others who are precursors to the Goldsmith-Perloff paradigm. Robert Baird argues in the comment section under Goldsmith's entry at
harriet (5/30) that in effect the salience to today's unoriginal (or uncreative or boring) processual poetry centers not so much on the power of its ideas or
concepts as on its distillation of author-function:
Goldsmith's originality lies not in destroying the author-function but in raising it to its purely formal apotheosis: he's demonstrated that the most radical refinement of the author-function so far is the author who doesn't have to write. And allow me to repeat: securing that apotheosis is an achievement, it is an act of genius, but it is both of these things because it's original.
Why not, simply, a processual poetics? One problem in conferring the broader term
conceptual poetics to process-oriented production emerges within the presumption that a regulated methodology is essential to conceptualization, and by extension, such methodology achieves a higher scale of reasoning and mental prowess than other kinds of text, evident in Craig Dworkin's rhetorical questions from the Introduction to his "Anthology of Conceptual Writing," published on Goldsmith's
Ubuweb:
...what would a non-expressive poetry look like? A poetry of intellect rather than emotion? One in which the substitutions at the heart of metaphor and image were replaced by the direct presentation of language itself, with "spontaneous overflow" supplanted by meticulous procedure and exhaustively logical process?
These descriptors point to a subset of conceptual poetry, but not the whole set.